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1. Introduction 
The relation between body and language has been well canvassed in the literature at 
the  ‘articulatory-perceptual’  level  (Chomsky  2002:28).  In  contrast,  the  ‘corporeal 
turn’ has not yet occurred at the level of its ‘conceptual-intentional’ features (Ruthrof 
1997: 254-261;289). In fact, the socialized human body is notoriously absent from our 
accounts  of  syntax,  semantics,  and  pragmatics.  For  over  a  century  a  yearning  for 
scientific clarity has lead to a denial of any perceptual traces which language may 
have inherited  from its  precursors. Yet it may  be precisely such traces that make 
meaning ‘rich, complex and unsuspected; in fact, barely known’ (Chomsky 2002:36). 
Indeed, the relation between body and language has largely remained a taboo. And 
while embodiment has been acknowledged in autopoietic research (Varela et al. 1991; 
Maturana and Varela 1987; Maturana 1980; Maturana 1978) and neuro-linguistics, 
(Lüdtke 2006; Lakoff and Gallese 2005; Fauconnier and Turner 2002; Lakoff and 
Johnson 1999; Fauconnier 1997; Turner 1991) we still lack a thoroughgoing corporeal 
theorisation of language as a whole.  
This is why I ask two questions. First, ‘why is it so difficult to produce a satisfactory 
theory of meaning for natural language?’ In a popular study, it takes David Crystal 
186 pages to address meaning, though much of what he says before that depends on 
the meanings of the expressions he cites (Crystal 2008). Nor has this dilemma been 
resolved in the available research on language. My second question is ‘what would it 
take to devise a theory able to account for the role of the socialized human body in 
language?’ Though at first blush the two questions appear to have little in common, I 
will argue that they are intimately related.  
 
 
2. What makes natural language semantics such a difficult nut to crack? 
Natural languages consist of such things as linguistic expressions and their phonetic 
representation; syntax and grammatical rules for generating sequences of linguistic 
signs;  semantics,  including  names,  definite  descriptions,  predicates,  quantifiers, 
demonstratives, pronouns, indexicals, logical connectives, disjunctions, conjunctions,  
implication,  entailment,  and  weak  synonymity;  as  well  as  pragmatics,  the  way                                                                                                                   Corpo e linguaggio, 
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language is employed in social situations. It is in semantics and pragmatics where 
research is most wanting. This, I claim, is a consequence of at least the following six 
flaws:  the  formal  fallacy;  syntactocentrism;  radical  arbitrariness;  loss  of  iconicity; 
homosemiotic  and  monosemiotic  assumptions;  and  the  absence  of  Vorstellung. 
Together  these  form  a  formidable  hurdle  to  the  kind  of  explanation  I  want  to 
advocate. 
 
 
2.1 The formal fallacy 
I call the ‘formal fallacy’ the confusion of natural language sense with formal sense. It 
is employed as a deliberate strategy by Gottlob Frege in the opening pages of ‘Sense 
and Reference’ of 1892, a move that has been continuously repeated in the philosophy 
of language to this day (Frege 1966). Frege’s ‘error’ consists in proceeding from the 
formal sense of intersecting lines in a triangle to the sense of ‘morning star’ and 
‘evening star’ as if the two kinds of sense were interchangeable without semantic 
damage (Ruthrof 1993). Yet there are marked differences between the way we know 
the meaning of ‘a’, ‘b’ and ‘c’ via definition within a formal Euclidian system and the 
way  we  know  the  meaning  of  ‘morning  star’  or  ‘evening  star’.  Without  typical 
experiences of mornings and evenings as referential background the terms would be 
meaningless, nor would they allow us to secure reference. The difference between 
reference  and  referential  background  is  essential  to  natural  language,  whereas  in 
formal sign systems the ‘background’ knowledge of geometry is itself formal and 
does not modify the sense of its expressions. Though essential in calculus, formal 
sense  plays  only  a  limited  role  in  natural  language.  Here,  referential  background 
functions as part of cultural semiosis and is inseparable from meaning. Moreover, 
Frege’s geometric sense is an a priori concept in contrast with natural language sense 
the dictionary entries for which are always the result of an a posteriori mapping of 
living speech. Not even Leibniz’s zureichender Grund is able to wipe out that crucial 
difference. A little later in his paper Frege realizes that his initial collapse of two 
kinds of sense also requires the elimination of Vorstellung. This is so because one 
person’s  idea  associated  with  a  term  is  not  the  same  as  another’s,  an  instance  of 
fuzziness  unfit  for  a  Begriffsschrift.  Thus  took  ‘iconic  cleansing’  root  in  the 
philosophy of language. The ubiquitous use of Frege’s moves in philosophy can only 
be hinted at here. There is Quine’s separation of the theory of meaning as intensional, 
comprising meaning, synonymy, significance, analyticity, and entailment, from the 
theory  of  reference  as  extensional,  consisting  in  naming,  truth,  denotation,  and 
extension.  (Quine  1993:52f.)  This  works  in  formal  systems  but  not  in  natural 
language (Eco 1984:45). Much the same goes for Carnap’s sense as the ‘intension of 
an individual expression’ (Carnap 1958:40). In natural language all expressions are 
extensional and in a broader than formal sense.  
 
                                                                                                                   Corpo e linguaggio, 
                                                                                                       2/2010 
138 
 
2.2 Syntactocentrism 
Another hurdle to a rich description of language is ‘syntactocentrism’ (Jackendoff 
1997:15). The strength of research on syntax lies in explicating the ordering principles 
we can abstract from living speech, as well semantic changes resulting from syntactic 
variation. But syntax cannot tell us how meanings come about; in natural language, 
the recognition of syntax presupposes meaning. Nor does syntax run quite as freely as 
its  formalisations  suggest.  This  criticism  applies  as  much  to  Carnap’s  semantics 
defined as an alignment of two kinds of syntax, (Carnap 1975; 1971) as it does to the 
syntactic picture painted by Jacques Lacan (Lacan 1985) and the generative principles 
in the work of Chomsky (Chomsky 1957;1965; 1995; 2002; 2005). Recursivity, for 
example, fails in the face of idioms. As Jackendoff notes, to regard idiomatic phrases 
as  ‘marginal’  is  a  fundamental  error  (Jackendoff  1997:154).  This  qualifies 
Humboldt’s claim that we can generate an infinite number of sentences from a limited 
stock  of  terms.  Recursive  infinity  is  a  theoretical  option  unexplored  in  cultural 
practice.  Mastery  of  a  language  is  judged  by  idiomatic  competence  rather  than 
expertise in recursive rules. As to predicability, (Keil 1979; 1981) the assumption is 
that what can and cannot be said of things and persons is dictated by syntax, such that 
‘the tree was sincere’ or ‘colourless green ideas sleep furiously’ are not predicable. 
This is not so. First, both sentences could function perfectly well in their own possible 
worlds, say cartoon stories with personified trees or puppets called ‘colourless green 
ideas’ who snore and toss violently in their beds. Predicability now is a function of 
the  sort  of  world  we  imagine  rather  than  of  syntax.  Second,  if  it  is  Leibnizian 
‘compossibility’ rather than grammaticality that dictates predicability, then we must 
turn our gaze to the socio-perceptual frame of language, its pre-linguistic precursors 
and the possibility of a perceptual proto-syntax. A similar criticism can be lodged 
against  the  notion  of  conditionals  as  linguistic  innovation.  According  to  Derek 
Bickerton, syntax did probably ‘not exist prior to our own species’. Phrases such as ‘x 
happened because y happened’ or ‘if x happens, either y or z will happen’, must have 
been  invented  by  natural  language  (Bickerton  1990:162;  Bickerton  1981;  1987). 
Though conditionals are strong markers of syntax, I reiterate Wittgenstein’s point that 
language,  including  syntax,  is  a  ‘refinement’  and  not  a  replacement  (Wittgenstein 
1976:3f.). It is not plausible that before the event of language hominids lived in chaos. 
‘If-then’  patterns  must  have  shaped  their  world  according  to  principles  of  human 
physiognomy  and  respect  for  objective  constraints  to  secure  survival.  If  so, 
conditionals, in a primitive form, have been inherited from pre-linguistic behaviour, a 
proto-syntax already incorporated in, rather than excluded from, Bickerton’s ‘proto-
language’ (Bickerton 1990:130-163).  
 
 
2.3 Radical arbitrariness 
A serious flaw is the continuing acceptance of Saussure’s radical arbitrariness thesis. 
‘The bond between the signifier and the signified is arbitrary’, we read in his Course 
in  General  Linguistics  of  1916,  and  since  the  sign  as  a  whole  ‘results  from  the 
associating of the signifier with the signified, I can simply say: the linguistic sign is                                                                                                                   Corpo e linguaggio, 
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arbitrary’  (Saussure  1974:67).  This  is  a  pars  pro  toto  fallacy  of  enormous 
consequence. Later on in the Course, Saussure concedes that there are always traces 
of motivation in all languages, a concession however which hardly diminishes the 
radicalism  of  his  claim    (Saussure  1974:131-134).  Imagine  a  situation  in  which 
speakers from different cultures, say Chinese, French, German, and English, engage 
in rudimentary conversation. The Chinese says ‘da muze’, pointing at his thumb. The 
others chime in with the signifiers ‘pouce’, ‘Daumen’, and ‘thumb’. Far from being 
arbitrary, the shared signified appears to be motivated. Without this intersubjective 
baseline, even such a minimal conversation could not take place, nor could wholesale 
translation  between  different  languages.  It  is  the  ostensive  ground  of  both  human 
physiognomy and perceptual world that appear to produce the motivated character of 
signifieds.  The  neglect  of  this  ostensive,  nonverbal  ground  was  precisely  what 
seduced  Quine  to  formulate  his  thesis  of  ‘untranslatability’  and  ‘indeterminacy  of 
reference’ (Quine 1993:50-52). In short, radical arbitrariness cannot be consistently 
argued for natural language. 
 
 
2.4 Loss of iconicity 
Arbitrariness and loss of iconicity, in the sense of resemblance relations, go hand in 
hand. For example, in a paper by Michael C. Corballis, a state of the art summary of 
evolutionary linguistics, we find both to play a prominent role (Corballis 2008:32f.; 
Hurford 2007:126ff.). Such is the influence of Frege’s elimination of Vorstellung and 
Saussure’s arbitrariness thesis. But while Saussure left the door open for iconic traces 
in his formulation of the concept (and its psychological image) as signified, many of 
his  successors  have  since  radicalised  the  sign  further  by  dropping  the  signified 
altogether, illegitimately leaving the signifier to carry semantic load (Laclau 1996; 
Hayles 1993). The resulting loss of iconicity is a serious handicap in the theorisation 
of language, for if we cannot address resemblance relations between language and 
world linguistic meaning collapses into syntactic circularity. 
 
 
2.5 Homosemiotic and monosemiotic assumptions 
Two further obstacles to a rich view of language are the related assumptions of its 
homosemiotic and monosemiotic character. In homosemiotic systems all signs are of 
the same kind, as in calculus; in monosemiotic systems we are dealing only with one 
kind of sign, as for instance in olfactory readings of airborne molecules. If we regard 
natural language as homosemiotic we deny the possibility of semiotic heterogeneity. 
This denial is widespread in philosophical semantics. In the naturalism of Devitt and 
Sterelny,  it  leads  to  the  alignment  of  language  and  world  without  a  tertium 
comparationis (Devitt and Sterelny 1991:15). Much the same can be said of some 
truth-conditional theories (e.g., Kempson 1975:31). In contrast, I will try to show that                                                                                                                   Corpo e linguaggio, 
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language is both polysemiotic and heterosemiotic. In preparation for this move we 
need to stipulate a further crucial concept, that of Vorstellung. 
 
 
2.6 Vorstellung 
Neither  perception  in  the  raw  sense  of  an  organism’s  response  to  molecules  and 
electromagnetic  radiation  nor  Vorstellung  as  a  summary  term  for  all  perceptual 
modifications, or mental states, plays a significant role in semantics and pragmatics. 
And  yet, without Vorstellung we would find it impossible to imagine anything in 
response  to  verbal  clues.  We  remember  that  Frege  eliminated  Vorstellung  from 
language as a precondition for sense as pure thought, a guarantor of logical identity. 
Yet,  as  Wittgenstein  notes,  ‘the  crystalline  purity  was,  of  course,  not  a  result  of 
investigation: it was a requirement’ (Wittgenstein 1953:46). 
Neither ‘pure thought’ nor ‘identity’ is a necessary  condition of natural language. 
While identity is essential in formal systems, not even weak synonymy yields much 
insight into how natural languages work. On the other hand, not only will we find that 
the elimination of Vorstellung was mistaken, we will discover that without it language 
could not function at all. To shore up the kind of concept of Vorstellung I have in 
mind I turn to an evolutionary perspective. 
 
 
3. Interlude: the neural ground of Vorstellung 
Vorstellung is roughly synonymous with Kant’s ‘inner sense’ which he thought of as 
‘the sum of all Vorstellungen’ and so subsumes his ‘reproductive’ Einbildungskraft 
under a broad umbrella (CPR A177/B220). All variations of perceptual input, which 
is  itself  always  already  modified  by  Vorstellung,  as  well  as  all  variations  of 
Vorstellungen,  make  up  our  Vorstellungswelt.  This  traditional  picture  can  now  be 
updated  with  the  help  of  some  recent  scientific  research.  In  his  paper  ‘Nano-
Intentionality: A Defense of Intrinsic Intentionality’, Tecumseh Fitch addresses the 
goal-directedness  of  living  eukaryotic  cells,  starting  with  one-cell  organisms  and 
ending with the complexities of neuron clusters in the human brain (Fitch 2008).  
Fitch describes as ‘nano-intentionality’ the capacity of eukaryotic single cells to alter 
their own molecules in response to external challenges, remember solutions and so 
extend their individual existence. Multi-cellularity and communal interaction of more 
specialised cells mark the path that ‘nano-intentionality’ takes up the evolutionary 
ladder.  Beyond  ‘nano-intentionality’  and  ‘micro-intentionality’,  neurons  learn  by 
generating  ‘models  of  the  world’  produced  within  the  nervous  system:  ‘once  the 
primary representation is in place, so is the machinery for illusions and hallucinations, 
and  more  adaptively,  imagery  and  imagination’.  Fitch  sums  up  the  evolution  of 
intrinsic intentionality in four steps: (1) nano-intentionality of eukaryotic cells over                                                                                                                   Corpo e linguaggio, 
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two billion years; (2) interacting nano-intentionality of multi-cellular organisms; (3) 
micro-intentionality  of  neurons;  (4)  neuron  based  capacity  for  representation  and 
serial awareness. This, then, is how ‘brains make minds’ (Fitch 2008:157-177).  
Accepting Fitch’s scenario as the current ‘best predicate’ provides us with a plausible 
picture of Vorstellung in both its reproductive and productive capacity, as the central 
mediator  between  our  perceptual  world  and  language.  From  here  we  can  relate 
Vorstellung and the two functions of language, representation and communication, by 
viewing  language  as  a  set  of  instructions  for  imagining  and  acting  in  the  world 
(Ruthrof 2007:22). Vorstellung, then, would be at the hub of our theory. If in reading 
any written text we were unable to imagine (quasi-perceptually, not propositionally) 
what slice of world was represented, we could not grasp its meaning. Vice versa, if 
we didn’t imagine a mental world prior to selecting linguistic expressions, we would 
do no more than repeat sequences of signifiers, a mere syntactic performance, that is, 
one without meaning. 
 
 
4. The body in language 
We can now address our second question: what would it take to construct a theory 
able to account for the role of the socialized human body in language? If natural 
language can be described as ‘a set of instructions for imagining, and acting in, the 
world’, then every linguistic utterance implies an indirect speech act such as ‘imagine 
the following’. Every utterance is intelligible in terms of the mental world (or cluster 
of signifieds) it codifies and in terms of the ability of listeners to project a mental 
world  from  what  they  hear,  within  social  constraints.  The  combination  of  public 
signifiers and mental states then would amount to linguistic communication. Central 
to  this  scenario  is  Vorstellung  as  perceptual  modification,  which  requires  the 
redefinition  of  the  linguistic  sign  and  its  components.  Instead  of  saying  that  the 
linguistic sign is arbitrary, we retain Saussure’s conventional signifier but redefine the 
signified as always motivated.  
 
 
4.1 The iconic signified 
The loss of iconicity deplored earlier can be remedied with help from such sources as 
Ernst  Cassirer’s  ‘sensuous  abstractions’  and  ‘schematised  percepts’  (Cassirer 
1957:331), Lev Vygotsky’s  ‘generalised reflection of reality’, his observation that 
‘thought and language reflect reality in a different way from perception’ and his idea 
of  an inner speech ‘saturated with sense to such an extent that it would require many 
words in external speech to explain it’ (Vygotsky 1962:153; 12). Iconicity in language 
can be reconstructed from within phenomenology by re-working such concepts as 
Edmund  Husserl’s  ‘appresentation’,  Alfred  Schutz’s  ‘typifications’  and  Roman 
Ingarden’s ‘concretisation’ (Husserl 1973; Schutz 1959; Ingarden 1973). The most                                                                                                                   Corpo e linguaggio, 
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compelling arguments for iconicity, however, can be found in the work of Charles 
Sanders  Peirce  and  his  insistence  that  for  anything  to  be  meaningful  it  must  be 
translatable into ‘iconic signs’ (Peirce 1.158).  
Although it would seem that signifieds typically come in linguistically conceptualized 
form, I separate iconic content from its conceptual regulation for two reasons. First, 
unlike Fodor’s ‘atomistic concept’, a concept from nowhere, the corporeal concept 
shows  whence  it  receives  its  content  (Fodor  1998).  Second,  there  remains  a 
fundamental semiotic rift between linguistic expressions and nonverbal signification. 
Contrary  to  the  claim  that  thought  without  language  is  an  ‘uncharted  nebula’, 
(Saussure  1974:112)  cognitive  science  has  shown  that  there  remain  sharp 
discrepancies between sensory readings and their linguistic codification (Ackerman 
1991). Our sense of smell, impoverished though it is, still lets us recognize thousands 
of  olfactory  distinctions  without  verbal  equivalents.  Our  gustatory  faculties  are 
likewise  superior  to  their  verbal  representations.  While  the  semiotic  rift  is  less 
prominent  in  the  tactile  and  visual  domain,  it  reminds  us  verbal  and  nonverbal 
signification continue to exist side by side. Given the evidence, there can be little 
doubt  then  that  raw  iconicity  precedes  our  linguistically  refined  conceptualized 
signifieds. However, this does not entitle us to say that language ‘conceptualizes the 
unconceptualized’, as does Brandom, who objects to human ‘preconceptual capacity 
sharable with non-concept using mammals’. Such a view is the consequence of an 
extreme,  top-down  ‘inferentialism’  in  an  ‘essentially  propositional  doctrine’ 
(Brandom 2001:16;24;13). It is much more plausible, as Alasdair McIntyre suggests, 
that even as language-users ‘we still rely in very large part on just the same kind of 
recognitions, discriminations, and exercises of perceptual attention that we did before 
we were able to make use of our linguistic powers’ (McIntyre 1999:40). What must 
be  stipulated  also  is  a  transformational  mechanism  by  which  quasi-perceptual 
iconicity, that is perception transformed into Vorstellung, is generalized to varying 
degrees  according  to  rules.  I  propose  that  this  function  is  provided  by  linguistic 
concepts. Now, iconic mental materials, such as olfactory, gustatory, haptic, tactile, 
proximic, thermal, gravitational, kinetic, visual, emotional and other readings of our 
Umwelt and ourselves, that is, nonverbal signification, supply the raw content which, 
under second-order conceptual regulation, make up the linguistic, iconic signified. 
 
 
4.2 The concept as social constraint   
While  the  pre-linguistic  concept  can  be  regarded  as  a  primitive  constraint  on 
iconicity, the linguistic concept fulfils the role of regulative refinement. At least four 
principles appear to dictate the linguistic concept orders nonverbal, iconic materials: 
directionality; quality; quantity; and degree of schematisation (Ruthrof 2009). This 
quadruple conceptual regulation reflects one of the ways in which culture and society 
control  language  as  praxis.  Social  monitoring  in  natural  language  takes  place  at 
different levels, inhibiting  as it does mentalist and subjectivist deviance.  In  rising 
order, social control appears at the level of phonetics, the lexicon, syntax, register or 
linguistic  propriety,  discourse,  discursive  paradigms,  and  the  meta-system  of                                                                                                                   Corpo e linguaggio, 
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sufficient semiosis. (see below) Typically, a linguistic concept directs us to attend to a 
specific  iconic  phenomenon,  this  person  or  that  object,  a  class  of  things,  a 
supercategory, or a subcategory. This part of the conceptualising process we can term 
the directionality of language. Iconic mental materials are regulated further in terms 
of quality as a specification of the kind of red, or the kind of touch; as to quantity, that 
is,  what  size,  or  how  many  spots;  and  degree  of  schematisation,  or  the  extent  of 
abstraction to which a signifier is to be semantically and pragmatically specified.  
 
 
4.3 Deictic and referential background 
A theory aiming to reconcile body and language also needs to take seriously two 
features which are typically absent from our standard descriptions: implicit deictic 
background  and  referential  background,  each  of  which  is  to  be  carefully 
distinguished from explicit deixis and reference, respectively. Deictic background can 
be explicated as the typical way a culture speaks its terms. The Mandarin signifier 
guanxi, for example, which is often translated as a corrupt use of social relations, has 
no such negative values when used as part of a conversation in Chinese. Without the 
right guanxi it is very hard to be successful in Chinese society. Its ‘neutral’ translation 
as ‘connection’ covers up that difference. Or compare the way the acronym IMF is 
spoken  by  members  of  lending  countries  and  members  of  societies  dependent  on 
borrowing  from  the  fund.  As  such,  implicit  deixis  or  deictic  background  must  be 
recognized  as  critical  in  intercultural  exchange.  At  the  same  time,  all  natural 
languages  cohere  as  systems  of  expressions  intelligible  against  their  referential 
background, a culture’s Vorstellungswelt. As such, referential background produces 
significant  semantic  effects  in  natural  language,  effects  that  a  corporeal  theory  of 
language  is  able  to  accommodate.  Nor  should referential  background  be  confused 
with reference, the link between a referring expression and a specific item picked out 
by it (Strawson 1950; Evans 1982). Fundamental to any such considerations of course 
is the level at which we decide to describe meaning. 
 
 
4.4 Redefining meaning  
Defining ‘literal meaning’ in Intentionality: An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind John 
Searle makes the claim that in the following set of examples the word ‘open’ retains 
the  same  literal  meaning:  ‘Tom  opened  the  door’;  ‘Sally  opened  her  eyes’;  ‘The 
carpenter opened the wall’; ‘Sam opened his book to page 37’; ‘The surgeon opened 
the wound’, ‘The chairman opened the meeting’; ‘The artillery opened fire’; and ‘Bill 
opened  a  restaurant’.  While  the  truth  conditions  may  change,  says  Searle,  ‘the 
semantic content is the same’ (Searle 1983:145f.). From the perspective of ordinary 
language  use  Searle’s  analysis  looks  odd.  No  reader  sensitive  to  the  nuances  of 
English would say that in such phrases as ‘opening fire’ and ‘opening a wound’ the                                                                                                                   Corpo e linguaggio, 
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meaning  of  ‘open’  remains  the  same.  Language  directs  us  to  imagine  radically 
different processes of ‘opening’. This is so because in the event of meaning we do not 
separate out the ‘atomistic’ components of expressions. Meaning occurs as a total 
package. In any meaning event, individual signifiers undergo substantive semantic-
pragmatic changes. ‘A giraffe drinks’ and ‘a baby drinks’ demand different meaning 
constructions of ‘drink’. In terms of our redefinition of the signified, we can say that 
in each case the iconic mental materials which we have been taught to bring to the 
task  of  making  meaning  of  ‘opening’  are  made  up  of  different  admixtures  of 
heterogeneous nonverbal readings conceptually regulated in distinct ways. In each 
case,  the  identical,  arbitrary  signifier  ‘opened’  directs  us  to  imagine  non-identical 
scenarios with different qualities of ‘opening’, distinct quanta of ‘how far’ and ‘how 
fast’, and varying degrees of schematisation. As a consequence, the meaning of the 
signifier ‘opened’ in each of Searle’s examples differs conspicuously.  
The source of difference between Searle’s sort of ‘meaning’ and the one advocated 
here is the result of an entirely different constitution of the semantic-pragmatic object 
itself. Inspired by a post-Fregean insistence on a pure sense, Searle has pegged his 
‘meaning’ at a level of generality which allows him to claim semantic identity. Nor is 
Searle  alone  in  this  kind  of  enterprise  (e.g.  Wiggins  1992;  Wunderlich  1980). 
‘Meaning  postulates’  and  ‘componential’  semantics  are  vulnerable  to  similar 
criticisms  (Carnap  1967;  Bierwisch  1970).  The  body  oriented  alternative  takes  its 
starting point from the opposite end of the formal-natural spectrum: actual speech and 
the hermeneutic process of Verstehen as interpretation (cf. Heidegger 1962:188-213 
and the hermeneutic tradition). The message, then, is clear. If we wish to re-associate 
language with the socialised human body we cannot but abandon the dream of the 
‘crystalline purity of logic’. As our analysis of Searle’s examples has demonstrated, 
what is required is sensitivity to the Vorstellung of iconic traces in linguistic meaning 
as interpretive event.  
 
 
4.5 Sufficient semiosis 
Another consequence of an emphasis on language as a recipe for imagining social-
perceptual scenarios in acts of Verstehen is that truth-conditional theories become 
superfluous. Or, more precisely, they retain their usefulness only in the theorisation of 
reference. This is so because understanding a sentence is a precondition for checking 
whether it is true or not, whether it is realist or fictional. We immediately grasp the 
meaning of ‘Did you see that rabbit?’ whether an actual rabbit was present or not. 
Meaning precedes truth. Nonetheless, language as a social system of representation 
and  communication  could  not  function  if  there  was  not  in  place  a  monitoring 
mechanism which retards rapid changes of linguistic meaning, a mechanism that can 
be conveyed via pedagogy and use. I have called this mechanism sufficient semiosis, 
with no more than a nod to Leibniz, to indicate the meta-linguistic function of flexible 
social constraints which native speakers have acquired through pedagogy, understood 
here broadly as the sum of all direct and indirect instructions by means of which 
speakers  acquire  linguistic  competence.  As  such,  sufficient  semiosis  regulates                                                                                                                   Corpo e linguaggio, 
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‘semantic  scope’  and  replaces  truth-conditions  by  telling  us  when  to  continue  a 
linguistic  exchange  as  useful,  negotiate  from  a  stance  of  the  ‘reciprocity  of 
standpoints’, (Schutz), dialogism (Bakhtin), or Horizontverschmelzung, (Gadamer), or 
terminate communication as unpromising. In this sense, sufficient semiosis acts as a 
framing condition for pragmatics and its preconditions. Nor should such preconditions 
be restricted to their formal, propositional skeleton, as in Grice’s elegant theorisation 
(Grice 1989). What strikes me as essential here is that any such preconditions are 
realised  first  and  foremost  in  quasi-perceptual  form,  that  is,  in  their  fundamental 
iconicity in and as Vorstellung as necessary condition of meaning within the social 
framing of sufficient semiosis. In the remainder of the paper I briefly address two 
more prominent hurdles in the way of any corporeal theory of natural language. 
 
 
5. Abstract expressions 
The distinction between concrete and abstract terms is useful only as a rough guide 
because  it  conceals  an  entire  spectrum  of  differences  between  the  two  stipulated 
polarities: the distinction fails to account for gradation. Yet it is in this broad in-
between domain where the bulk of terms is located. In light of our redefinition of 
linguistic concepts, varying degrees of schematisation of iconic mental materials can 
now be observed on a spectrum from specification to generalisation. The ‘red, gull-
wing  300SEL  sports  car’  can  be  contrasted  with  the  more  general  ‘car’,  its 
supercategories  ‘motor  vehicle’,  ‘vehicle’,  and  so  on,  up  to  ‘entity’.  In  any  such 
series,  even  at  the  most  abstract  level,  the  signified  still  retains  traces  of  mental 
material content activated and conceptually regulated for meaning. No matter how 
abstract,  such  a  signified  can  always  be  distinguished  from  any  full-blown 
formalisation x. A frequent mistake in semantics is the assumption that the kind of 
abstraction that is operative in language is indeed formalisation. This is not to say that 
the formalisation of natural language is not possible. It certainly is. Yet when we 
perform it, we should not be surprised that we can do so since, after all, we have 
derived the tools of formalisation from natural language in the first place. What we 
have so reduced must however not be mixed up with natural language. Materiality, in 
the  form  of  quasi-perceptual  mental  states,  never  entirely  vanishes.  Even  highly 
abstract terms, such as ‘freedom’, retain a quasi-perceptual correlate in Vorstellung, 
of what it feels like to be free rather than restricted. Persons who have just been 
released  from  incarceration  shouting  ‘freedom’  are  uttering  the  term  with  a  high 
concentration of iconicity compared to the same term being discussed in a legislative 
council. In the latter, emotive, iconic mental materials are drastically schematised, a 
process  which  however  never  turns  the  signifier  ‘freedom’  into  a  mere  formally 
empty placeholder. Herein lies a fundamental difference between formal signification 
and natural language.  
Nor do so-called ‘function words’ escape this stricture. Eve Sweetser for one has 
made a persuasive case for ‘if’, ‘but’, ‘and’, and other syncategorematic terms having 
retained perceptual, social traces (Sweetser 1990). Using her arguments, we can apply 
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pragmatics  early  in  the  paper,  such  as  names  via  quantifiers  to  disjunctions  and 
logical entailment. I have argued elsewhere that while we can speak of the signifiers 
of natural language as iconically ‘disembodied’ vehicles, in their signifieds the very 
corporeality so lost is retrieved in Vorstellung under conceptual constraints and as a 
result of pedagogy (Ruthrof 2000:85-116). Such are the bare bones for an argument in 
favour of recognizing the role of the body even in abstract terms. Another bugbear for 
bringing the body back into language is the public character of linguistic expressions. 
 
 
6. On the public nature of linguistic expressions 
There is not much of a haggle over the question of how public are linguistic signifiers. 
After all, they are given in an objective sense in dictionaries and in the sounds of the 
public use of language. Syntactic patterns appear to have more public visibility than 
the generative rules we can formalise from them. However, to claim that signifieds 
and their instantiations as meanings in pragmatic events are likewise public would 
amount to using the term in a quite different sense. Yet meanings cannot be called 
‘private’ either (Wittgenstein 1953: 94ff.). In meaning events we are dealing with 
intersubjectively shared Vorstellung regulated by concepts under the constraints of 
sufficient semiosis. An advantage of Searle’s ‘literal meaning’ is that it is public as a 
consequence of the identity conditions he has imposed on it. A serious disadvantage is 
that  Searle’s  ‘meaning’  occurs  only  in  specialised,  technical  discourse.  Without 
introducing  the  socialised  human  body  in  the  form  of  Vorstellung,  instantiated  in 
minds,  brains  and  heads,  natural  language  expressions  do  not  mean  at  all.  Their 
meanings can be called public only to the extent to which pedagogy and use are able 
to control the mental states of native speakers. We could therefore regard meanings as 
indirectly  public.  To  guard  against  the  charge  of  mentalism  and  subjectivism, 
sufficient  semiosis,  then,  must  be  invoked  once  more  as  social  guarantee  for  the 
intersubjectivity of individual linguistic, mental states. 
 
 
7. Conclusion 
We can now give a single, broad answer to both our initial questions. Formulating a 
satisfactory natural language semantics has proved so difficult because we have failed 
to  account  for  the  presence  of  the  socialized  human  body  in  language,  which  is 
required  for  the  activation  of  arbitrary  signifiers  by  nonverbal  mental  materials 
regulated and schematized to varying degrees by concepts in the neuron based human 
Vorstellung. 
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